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EDITOR’S NOTE*
On March 2-3, 2000, the Duke Environmental Law & Policy
Forum sponsored and hosted a symposium entitled “Citizen Suits and
the Future of Standing in the 21st Century: From Lujan to Laidlaw
and Beyond.”  In the following double-issue of the Duke
Environmental Law & Policy Forum, we are pleased to present
papers resulting from that conference.
The symposium was designed to offer a handful of the nation’s
most respected legal and economic scholars an opportunity to discuss
the nature of citizen-suit standing after the Supreme Court’s decision
in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.1
The Laidlaw decision marked a clear turn in the twisting road courts
have followed in the development of standing doctrine for citizen
suits.2  The conference thus provided a forum for discussion on the
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1. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).  Incidentally, the timing of the conference was nearly perfect as
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Laidlaw case on January 12, 2000, only a
month and a half before the conference was held.
2. Citizen suits are lawsuits in which private citizens sue on behalf of the public.  Many
environmental statutes confer upon citizens this ability, most notably the Clean Water Act, the
Clean Air Act, and the Endangered Species Act.  See Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean
Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994); Air Pollution Prevention and Control (Clean Air) Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994); but
see Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (1994 & Supp. V
1999) (containing no citizen-suit provision).
Despite these legislatively conferred rights, the Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), raised the bar a citizen-plaintiff must clear in order to bring
suit on behalf of the public.  In Lujan, the Court held that a plaintiff bringing a citizen suit must
suffer an “injury in fact” that is “actual” or “concrete” to have standing in federal court.  See id.
at 560, 573-74; see also id. at 573 (stating that the injuries pled by the Defenders of Wildlife
were “abstract” and “noninstrumental”).  Most citizen-suit provisions, however, explicitly
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status of current standing law and what legacy the “path followed”
has left for future standing analysis.
Gene R. Nichol, Dean of the University of North Carolina
School of Law, delivered the conference’s opening address.  Dean
Nichol spoke on the “impossibility of Lujan’s project.”3  In particular,
Dean Nichol explained that the Lujan Court’s decision to restrict a
citizen’s ability to bring suit on behalf of the public interest was not
consistent with either statutory law or legislative purpose.4  Dean
Nichol then discussed the value of the Laidlaw decision for future
citizen suits.  In short, Dean Nichol stated, “Laidlaw is right in its
                                                                                                                                     
confer the right to bring such suits to “any person” or “any citizen.”  See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a) (“any person may commence a civil action . . . .”); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a) (“any citizen may commence a civil action . . . .”).  The Lujan Court combined the
constitutional requirement of “injury in fact” to this statutorily granted standard.  The Laidlaw
Court, however, reversed its path and decided that the legislatively conferred requirements for
standing were appropriate.
3. See Gene R. Nichol, The Impossibility of Lujan’s Project, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 193 (2001).
4. “Lujan’s project,” as explicated by Dean Nichol, was to move away from legislative
history and intent and return to strict constitutional construction.  The goal of this movement
was to remove the possibility of having citizens serve as “private attorneys general.”  The
“project” was advocated by Justice Scalia, and is encapsulated in Justice Scalia’s concurring
opinion in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991).  In that case, Justice
Scalia criticized the Court for its examination of legislative history.  He stated: “Committee
Reports are [unreliable] not only as a genuine indicator of congressional intent but as a safe
predictor of judicial construction.  We use them when it is convenient, and ignore them when it
is not.”  See id. at 617 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice White, joined by the other seven Justices,
responded in the majority opinion by pointing out that “the Court’s practice of utilizing
legislative history reaches well into its past.”  See id. at 610 (citing Wallace v. Parker, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 680, 687-90 (1832), which investigated the legislative history behind a law granting land to
soldiers in compensation for their service).
Although Justice Scalia did not gain a majority with his opinion in Mortier, his theory
of strict constitutional construction did make its way into standing law in the ‘90s.  See, e.g.,
Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.  In fact, “Lujan’s project” played a major role in standing cases until
Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (involving a suit filed against the
FEC for failure to provide information guaranteed under the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971).  In Akins, the plaintiff’s standing depended on a legislatively conferred right of
standing.  Before finding sufficient traceability of injury, the Court found that the
congressionally conferred standing met the injury in fact requirement, stating:
The "injury in fact" that respondents have suffered consists of their inability to obtain
information . . . that, on respondents' view of the law, the statute requires that [the
FEC] make public.  There is no reason to doubt their claim that the information would
help them . . . to evaluate candidates for public office, especially candidates who
received assistance from [the FEC], and to evaluate the role that [the FEC’s] financial
assistance might play in a specific election.  Respondents' injury consequently seems
concrete and particular.
Akins, 524 U.S. at 21.
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essential answer” that public law should not be re-made through
standing doctrine.5
After Dean Nichol’s address, the first panel of speakers
discussed and analyzed recent standing cases.  All of the panel
participants either argued or filed briefs in the Laidlaw or Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.6 cases.  Professor
Jonathan Baert Wiener of the Duke University School of Law and
the Nicholas School of the Environment moderated this panel.  Bruce
J. Terris of Terris, Pravlik & Millian, L.L.P. was the first speaker.
Mr. Terris argued on behalf of Friends of the Earth, Inc. in the
Laidlaw case before the Supreme Court and in the Gaston Copper
case before the Fourth Circuit.  Mr. Terris spoke on the purpose of
standing law as seen by a practitioner.  He proposed that the
principles of standing law, as the Supreme Court succinctly stated in
Baker v. Carr,7 had been ignored in Lujan-era jurisprudence.  Indeed,
Mr. Terris stated he thought that standing as it existed post-Lujan did
not come close to its principles.  Mr. Terris submitted that the
Laidlaw decision, however, might make it easier for courts to adhere
to these principles in future standing cases.
Following Mr. Terris, Donald A. Cockrill, of Ogletree, Deakins,
Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., spoke on his view of the Laidlaw
decisions.  Mr. Cockrill argued on behalf of Laidlaw Environmental
Services, Inc. in the Laidlaw case before the Supreme Court and
Fourth Circuit.8  Mr. Cockrill discussed the impact Laidlaw would
have on future environmental defendants.  He proposed that the 7-2
Supreme Court decision may, in effect, mean that future Clean Water
Act violators will be held strictly liable for their permit violations.
5. See Nichol, supra note 3, at 194.
6. 179 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d en banc, 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) (involving
citizen-suit claims under the Clean Water Act).  In the original Gaston Copper decision, the
Fourth Circuit held that without proof of the traceability of specific permit violations to specific
injuries suffered by the plaintiffs, no one could claim an injury sufficient to obtain standing.
The en banc rehearing of Gaston Copper occurred after the Supreme Court decided the
Laidlaw case.  The result was a decision that conformed more to the language of the Clean
Water Act and the Laidlaw decision.  The court held that merely having a “sufficient personal
stake” was adequate to meet the standing requirement.  See Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 153.
7. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  In Baker v. Carr, a case involving the ability of citizens to bring
equal protection suits on behalf of the public, the Court stated: “Have the appellants alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing.”
Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
8. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998).
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The next speaker was Harold W. Jacobs, of Nexsen, Pruet,
Jacobs & Pollard, L.L.C., who argued on behalf of Gaston Copper
Recycling Corp. before the Fourth Circuit.  Mr. Jacobs spoke on the
facts that surrounded the Gaston Copper decision.  In his speech, Mr.
Jacobs posed the question that in light of Laidlaw, “are proximity to
a polluting plant—and that the pollution offends one—the only issues
that need to be proved to bring a successful Clean Water Act case?”
Next to speak was Kenneth P. Woodington of the South
Carolina Attorney General’s office.  Mr. Woodington filed the
amicus brief on behalf of the State in favor of Laidlaw Environmental
Services, Inc.  Mr. Woodington discussed the State’s unique position
in the Laidlaw case: the State argued that neither the State nor its
agencies should be subject to federal litigation once compliance had
been reached through State administrative action.9  South Carolina
thus was arguing, in effect, in favor of Laidlaw violating its state-
issued permits.
Mr. Woodington was followed by Justin Smith of the
Environmental & Natural Resources Division of the Department of
Justice (DOJ), who spoke about DOJ’s general perspective on citizen
suits.  Finally, Jim Hecker, an Environmental Enforcement Attorney
for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, spoke on the amicus brief his
organization assisted the petitioning environmental organizations in
drafting for the Laidlaw case.  Mr. Hecker noted that the petitioning
environmental groups had anticipated that the mootness issue would
be the focus of the litigation, rather than the standing issue.
The following morning, a panel of six scholars discussed the
history of standing jurisprudence from Lujan to Laidlaw.  Professor
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. of the Duke University School of Law
moderated this panel.
The first featured speaker of the morning panel was Professor
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., of the George Washington University School of
Law.  Professor Pierce discussed his accord with the argument posed
by Dean Nichol in his opening address.  In particular, Professor
Pierce agreed that the Lujan decision had moved toward a standard
of near molecular traceability.  The Laidlaw decision marked a clear
step away from that standard.  Professor Pierce cautioned, however,
that the Laidlaw decision cannot be counted as a permanent victory
9. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of the State of South Carolina in Support of




quite yet.  Rather, Professor Pierce posited that because of the make-
up of the current Court, combined with the long list of inconsistent
standing decisions, it will be five to ten years before the impact of
Laidlaw can be fairly assessed. 10
Professor William W. Buzbee of the Emory University School of
Law spoke next and presented his paper11 on the relation of standing
law to legislative judgments of statutory purpose.  Professor Buzbee
asserted that the sequence of cases leading to Laidlaw in fact may
show that the Laidlaw case is not as far removed from previous
judicial opinions as it may seem.
John D. Echeverria, the Director of the Environmental Policy
Project and Adjunct Professor of Law at the Georgetown University
Law Center, followed Professor Buzbee.  Professor Echeverria
presented his paper12 which closely examines the Laidlaw decision
and asks: what theory of standing will take place as a result of
Laidlaw?  Professor Echeverria speculated that Laidlaw’s theory of
standing should hinge on the hypothesis that Article III prevents
legislation that creates rights of action.
Dr. Michael S. Greve, the Executive Director of the Center for
Individual Rights then presented his paper13 on the link between
standing and federalism.  Dr. Greve argued that the Court in Laidlaw
backed off from congressional interests and was too cautious in its
judgment.
Next to speak was Robert V. Percival, Director of the
Environmental Law Program and Professor at the University of
Maryland School of Law.  Professor Percival presented the argument
that Laidlaw did not affect a fundamental change in the law of
10. Professor Pierce contributed an article to this issue that was written in advance of the
Laidlaw decision and predicts the outcome of the case by analyzing previous standing
decisions.  Professor Pierce’s article includes a postscript in which he discusses the impact of the
Court’s Laidlaw decision.  See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Issues Raised by Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services: Access to the Courts for Environmental Plaintiffs, 11 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 207 (2001).
11. William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 247 (2001).
12. John D. Echeverria, Critiquing Laidlaw: Congressional Power to Confer Standing and
the Irrelevance of Mootness Doctrine to Civil Penalties, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 287
(2001).
13. Michael S. Greve, Friends of the Earth, Foes of Federalism, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 167 (2001).  Dr. Greve is now the John G. Searle Scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute.
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standing.14  Rather, Professor Percival argued that Laidlaw simply
departed from the application of the private law model to assess
litigants’ standing.
The final speaker of the morning panel was Professor Steven L.
Winter of Brooklyn Law School.  Professor Winter presented his
paper15 on the inconsistency of Justice Scalia’s standing theory with
legal history and the rule of law.  The Laidlaw decision, as Professor
Winter discussed, does not mark a new step in the development of
standing doctrine.  Instead, Professor Winter asserted that the
Laidlaw decision is grounded in a return to historical precedent.
Indeed, Professor Winter pointed out that the decision in Laidlaw
can find its historical roots in the jurisprudence of even the earliest
American courts.
Professor Donald T. Hornstein of the University of North
Carolina School of Law moderated the afternoon panel, which
discussed the alternatives and future of standing jurisprudence.  The
first speaker of the afternoon panel was Jonathan H. Adler a Senior
Fellow of Environmental Policy at the Competitive Enterprise
Institute.  Mr. Adler presented his paper16 addressing whether
liberalized standing rules advance environmental protection.  Mr.
Adler maintained that liberalized standing rules cannot be assumed
to improve environmental quality.  In fact, Mr. Adler contended that
a system of property rights in environmental resources might better
serve environmental goals than the current system of citizen-suit
provisions.
Next to speak was Professor Andy H. Barnett of the Auburn
University College of Business.  Professor Barnett presented the
paper17 he co-authored with Professor Timothy D. Terrell of Wofford
College, which analyzes the economics of citizen-suit provisions in
environmental legislation.  Professor Barnett introduced the concept
14. See Robert V. Percival & Joanna B. Coger, Escaping the Common Law’s Shadow:
Standing in the Light of Laidlaw, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 119 (2001).
15. Steven L. Winter, What if Justice Scalia Took History and the Rule of Law Seriously?,
12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 155 (2001).
16. Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental
Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39 (2001).  Mr. Adler is now a law clerk for The
Honorable David B. Sentelle, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.
17. A.H. Barnett & Timothy D. Terrell, Economic Observations on Citizen-Suit Provisions
of Environmental Legislation, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2001).  Professor Barnett is
now teaching at the American University of Sharjah, in the United Arab Emirates.
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of standing as a property right and discussed the economics of
allowing private persons to act as “private attorneys general.”
Professor Barnett also discussed the economic implications of the
Laidlaw Court’s determination of “concern” as being sufficient basis
to grant standing to citizen-suit plaintiffs.
Karl S. Coplan, Co-Director of the Pace Environmental
Litigation Clinic, Inc. and Associate Professor of Law at the Pace
University School of Law, spoke next.  Professor Coplan addressed
the standing afforded to environmental organizations in light of
Laidlaw.18  Professor Coplan discussed the oddity of corporate for-
profit interests being able to gain standing with greater ease than not-
for-profit organizations.  Professor Coplan noted that this dichotomy
is in fact significantly different than what the Framers faced in the
eighteenth century.
The next speaker was Professor Harold J. Krent of the Chicago-
Kent College of Law, who presented his paper19 on the effect the
Laidlaw decision will have in determining the role Congress has in
defining redressability.  Professor Krent argued that courts should
defer to congressional findings in deciding redressability, but that
courts should not find—regardless of congressional determinations—
redressability for plaintiffs claiming an interest in a suit unless the
award provides compensation for a past injury or supplies sufficient
deterrence to prevent future wrongdoing.
The final speaker of the afternoon panel was Professor Maxwell
L. Stearns of the George Mason University School of Law.  Professor
Stearns presented his paper20 on the application of the social choice
model to statutory standing.  In applying his social choice model,
Professor Stearns suggested that collective decision-making may
provide some explanation for the current nature of standing doctrine.
The Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum would like to
thank all of the participants in this conference.  It is an honor to
publish the papers resulting from this fantastic colloquium.
— Jonathan T. Ryan
18. See Karl S. Coplan, Direct Environmental Standing for Chartered Conservation
Corporations, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 183 (2001).
19. Harold J. Krent, Laidlaw: Redressing the Law of Redressability, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 85 (2001).
20. Maxwell L. Stearns, From Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Model of Environmental
Standing, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 321 (2001).
